ABSTRACT Searchable encryption plays a vital role in keeping data privacy of current cloud storage. Considering the security threat of trapdoor exposure, Emura et al. introduced a formal definition of keywords revocable public-key encryption with keywords search (KR-PEKS), which satisfies trapdoor exposure resistance (TER) and trapdoor re-generability. However, there is little work on lattice-based searchable encryption schemes to have the above properties, while it was widely accepted that cryptosystem on lattice has the potential to resist quantum computing attack. In this paper, we give a model of KR-PEKS with novel security, called bounded TER, i.e., a bounded number (previously set) of trapdoors for per keyword are exposed, which cannot affect other keywords. Then, we propose a lattice-based KR-PEKS scheme with bounded TER and trapdoor re-generability and show that this scheme is secure under the hardness assumption of learning with errors (LWE) problem. Finally, we conduct some simulation experiments on our scheme and give a comparison, which indicates that our scheme has less computational cost than the prior arts.
I. INTRODUCTION
As data volumes increase, more and more users outsource their data to a cloud, which transfers the storage function of local devices, such as laptops and smartphones, into the cloud server. Thus a data owner will lose physical control of data, which leads to some trouble on the privacy and security of sensitive data. In order to solve this issue, people encrypt data before uploading it into the cloud. However, it will cause another problem, i.e., encrypted data loses its searchability. Searchable encryption (SE) is a technique to deal with this problem, and it enables an authorized client to retrieve the encrypted data with a designed search trapdoor.
In 2004, Boneh et al. introduced public key encryption with keywords search (PEKS) firstly and gave a construction by transforming an anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [1] . For a PEKS scheme, there are three parties: server, sender, and receiver. The sender (or say data owner) uploads data into the server after encrypting it with the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ahmed M. Elmisery. receiver's public key. When the receiver wants to search some data stored in the server, he will generate a trapdoor T w of keyword w using his private key and then send T w to the server as a search request. The server will run the test algorithm by ciphertext of keyword and the trapdoor, and return a result on the search permission. In the above course, nothing useful is leaked from the trapdoor and ciphertext.
On the other hand, as Peter Shor proposed a quantum algorithm to solve Integer Factorization Problem and Discrete Logarithm Problem, many current cryptosystems in use whose security is based on the hardness assumption of the above problems, such as RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, will be fragile and cannot be used in quantum era. As a countermeasure to the potential crisis from quantum attack, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is also known as the next generational cryptography, has been widely studied and the standardization for PQC has been carried out by NIST from 2017 [2] . Lattice-based cryptography becomes one of the most promising candidates of PQC, since it's considered to have some advantages, including efficiency, the worst-case hardness assumption, and being used to achieve some cryptographic primitives, etc.. The known lattice-based cryptographic primitives have been proposed, for example, public key encryption [3] , [4] , signature schemes [5] , [6] , IBE schemes [7] - [9] , key agreement schemes [10] - [12] , fully homomorphic encryption [13] , [14] , etc..
As far, most existing searchable encryption schemes were constructed under the hardness assumption of bilinear map problems [1] , [15] - [17] or others [18] - [20] which cannot resist quantum computing attack. So searchable encryption scheme that can resist quantum computing attack is an urgent issue. Since then, some lattice-based searchable encryption schemes [21] - [24] were proposed.
A. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In the public key searchable encryption with keywords search (PEKS), trapdoors are stored into sever and may be exposed. Then anyone can run the test algorithm, which can lead to the leak of the receiver's privacy, i.e. which keywords are searched. To deal with the above problem, some researchers proposed secure channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS), where the server adds his secret key into the test algorithm to offer a secure transmission channel [25] - [27] . However, there is a threat that secret key of the sever is exposed.
Another method is to revoke trapdoors that have been exposed (or used). Moreover, the certain keywords revocation function is not enough in practical application, since it's impossible that keywords will never be searched after being revoked. So trapdoor regeneration needs to be considered. In 2015, Emura et al. [28] firstly introduced a formal definition of keywords revocable public key searchable encryption with keywords search (KR-PEKS). This scheme supports trapdoor exposure resistance where a trapdoor exposed cannot affect other trapdoors, and trapdoor regeneration where a new trapdoor for revoked keyword can still be generated.
However, there is no work on KR-PEKS with the above properties, which can resist quantum attack as far as we know. On the other hand, there are some proposed searchable encryption schemes which can resist quantum computing attack. However, all of these schemes don't consider the problem of trapdoor exposure and regeneration. In this paper, we first study how to realize that a KR-PEKS scheme can not only be trapdoor exposure resistance and trapdoor regeneration but also be against quantum attack to cope with the future threat to cloud storage from quantum computing attack.
In our work, we define a new security model for KR-PEKS, Bounded Trapdoor Exposure Resistance (Bounded TER). Here we give briefly an explanation as follows.
Bounded TER: Given a number Q set previously, Q-Bounded TER means an adversary is allowed to query bounded number Q short-term trapdoors for challenge keywords, which implies it cannot affect other trapdoors even if bounded trapdoors are exposed for every keyword. Obviously, our security model is weaker than (unbounded) trapdoor exposure resistance proposed in [28] where unbounded number trapdoors are allowed to leak. But we believe that our scheme is sufficient for practical application by setting large enough number Q.
Our contributions are as follows. 1) We introduce a model of keywords revocable searchable encryption with novel security, Bounded TER to reduce the effect of trapdoor exposure, and a function of trapdoor regeneration to guarantee that keywords can still be used after they have been revoked. Under the model, a receiver generates an initial trapdoor for long-term use and a short-term trapdoor for searching. A short-term trapdoor is removed if trapdoor is exposed. Moreover, when a keyword is revoked, to make the corresponding keyword be searched once more, the new trapdoor can be generated by choosing a new tag and adding into the keywords list. 2) We firstly propose a lattice-based keywords revocable searchable encryption scheme which can realize the above properties. It's proved that its security can be reduced to the hardness assumption of LWE problem, which indicates the scheme has the potential to resist quantum computer attack. We use traditional transformation method [29] on Takayasu et al.'s RIBE scheme [8] , employ binary tree and KUNode algorithm to realize the revocation of keywords, and guarantee Q-Bounded TER security by cover free families. 3) We conduct some simulation experiments and give a comparison of the performance with other searchable encryption schemes, which indicates our scheme has less computational cost.
B. RELATED WORKS
Abdalla et al. [29] gave a general transformation method between IBE and PEKS, where a keyword w is regarded as identity, the trapdoor T w of keyword w can be regarded as private key related to identity, use keyword w to encrypt a message chosen randomly. If decryption succeeds by using trapdoor, test algorithm will output 1. Especially anonymity of identity on IBE is necessary for keeping keywords' privacy in PEKS scheme. Abdalla et al. [29] also proved that anonymous Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) can be converted into public-key encryption with temporary keywords search (PETKS). PETKS guarantees that the test algorithm can be executed during a priorset time period. However, if a trapdoor has been exposed in the period, it can still be used for searching and cannot be revoked.
Yu et al. [15] proposed public key encryption with revocable keywords search, where the search capability is restricted in different time periods. Zhang and Mao [16] used hash chain and anonymous multi-receiver encryption scheme to propose a pairing-based public key encryption with revocable keyword scheme.
Boldyreva et al. [30] introduced an efficient RIBE which can realize identity revocation in case of the effect of malicious users. And based on a realistic scenario of leakage of the decryption key, Seo and Emura [31] proposed an RIBE with new security, called decryption key exposure resistance (DKER), and gave a construction on bilinear maps. Inspired by the above work and considering trapdoor exposure, Emura et.al [28] gave a formal definition of keywords revocable public key encryption with searchable encryption (KR-PEKS) which can realize trapdoor exposure resistance and trapdoor regeneration. They also showed anonymous RIBE with DKER and identity rejoin can be transformed into a KR-PEKS with the above properties.
Zhang and Xu [21] proposed a public key searchable encryption with a designated cloud server based on LWE problem from lattice, which can remove the secure channel between the server and the receiver by designating a unique cloud server to test and return the search results.
Behnia et al. [24] proposed two PEKS schemes from a view of the experiment, where one scheme is based on NTRU, the other is based on LWE problem. In this work, they implemented NTRU-PEKS that is 18 times lower end-to-end delay than the most efficient pairing-based scheme.
C. ROADMAP
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents some preliminaries of hard problems on lattice, lattice algorithms, and related techniques. Section III introduces the syntax of our searchable encryption model with a new security definition. In section IV, we propose a specific construction of lattice-based searchable encryption scheme and show a performance evaluation on our scheme. Finally, we give a conclusion in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Some notations are given as 
is that there exist positive c and m such that for any x > m, Here m is the dimension, and n is the rank. We say the lattice is full-rank if m = n.
Two special sets Λ ⊥ q (A) and Λ u q (A) related with our scheme are given as follows, where Λ ⊥ q (A) is a m-dimensional integer lattice and Λ u q (A) is a coset of the former. Hence Λ u q (A) =t +Λ ⊥ q (A) if there exists a vector t ∈ Λ u q (A). We note that Λ u q (A) isn't a lattice. Without loss of generality, let T A ∈ Z m×m be the basis of a lattice
is a full-rank matrix. Definition 2.1: For positive integers n, m and prime q, given A ∈ Z n×m q and u ∈ Z n q , we introduce two sets:
We say D ,σ,c is a Discrete Gaussian Distribution over with a center c and parameter σ . When c= 0, we denote by D ,σ . There are some properties about Gaussian Distribution.
Lemma 1: [7] Let be an m-dimensional lattice with a basis T , suppose
Given positive integer n, prime q, and m ≥ 2n log q, then for all but a 2q −n fraction of all A ∈ Z n×m q and for any σ ≥ w( √ log m), the distribution of u = A e mod q is statistically close to uniform over Z n q where e← D Z m ,σ . Moreover, the conditional distribution of e given Ae= u mod q is exactly D Λ u q (A),σ . With the background above, the definition of Learning With Errors (LWE) problem on lattice is given as follows, which can be reduced to the worst-case GapSVP on lattice [3] , [32] .
Definition 2.2 (LWE problem): [3] For a positive integer n, set m = m(n) and α
∈ (0, 1) such that a prime q = q(n) > 2 and αq > 2 √ n, let A ← R Z n×m q , e← Ψ m q , and a secret s ← R Z n q , we say (A, A T s+e) ∈ (Z n×m q × Z m q ) obeys LWE distribution. Moreover, let x ← R Z m q ,
we say any probability polynomial time (PPT) adversary A can decide the LWE problem if an advantage of LWE problem Adv LWE
A = |Pr[A (A, A T s + e ) = 1] − Pr[A (A, x ) = 1]| is non-negligible on n with uniform distribution (A, x ) ← U (Z n×m q × Z m q ).
B. LATTICE ALGORITHMS
The following part introduces the most well-known algorithms on lattice, e.g. Trapdoor Generation Algorithm, SampleLeft Algorithm, etc..
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Lemma 3 (Trapdoor Generation Algorithm): [7] , [33] , [34] 
Lemma 6 (SampleRight Algorithm): [35] 
In the following construction, we utilize the gadget matrix G at SampleLeft Algorithm, to get smaller parameters [36] .
We introduce an injective encoding function to transform from a vector to a matrix as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Full-rank Difference map, FRD): [35] Given a prime q and a positive integer n, a function H :
is a full-rank difference function, if it satisfies the following conditions:
2) H is computable in polynomial time (in n log q).
C. COVER FREE FAMILIES
The Cover Free Family is used to construct the following searchable encryption scheme that satisfies the given security, and its definition is described as follows. add root to Y 4: else 5: while (η i , T i ) ∈ RL do 6: if T i T then 7: add Path(η i ) to X 8: end if 9: X := X ∪ X 10: end while 11: while θ ∈ X do 12: if θ l / ∈ X then 13: add θ l to Y 14: end if 15: if θ r / ∈ X then 16: add θ r to Y Our scheme employs a binary tree to realize the revocation of keywords. For a binary tree BT with root node root, if a node η is the leaf node, let Path(η) denote the set of nodes from η to root. Otherwise, let η l and η r be the left and right child of η, respectively. Thus the tree is defined by all of these nodes.
Let each leaf node η represent a keyword in our construction (we say keyword η for convenient). When a keyword enrolls, every node in Path(η) is provided with a set about trapdoor information. If a keyword η is revoked at timeperiod T , then (η, T ) ∈ RL, where RL is the revocation list.
KUNode algorithm in the following content outputs a set of nodes Y , and this algorithm satisfies Path(η) ∩ Y = ∅ iff the corresponding keyword η is not revoked.
Definition 2.5 (KUNode Algorithm): [30] KUNode(BT , RL,T ) → Y : Input a binary tree BT , revocation list RL, and time T , then return a set of nodes Y . The algorithm is executed as Algorithm 1.
The output set Y satisfies that none of leaf node in RL which has been revoked at time-period T has any ancestor (or themselves) in Y , and other leaf nodes (corresponding the non-revoked keywords) have one ancestor (or themselves) in this set.
We give an example to describe how we use the algorithm in our work. There are 8 keywords {w 1 , . . . , w 8 } which are assigned to the leaf nodes as Figure 1 . Then the information related to keyword η and trapdoor is generated and stored in all of the nodes in Path(η). If there are no keywords revoked at time-period T , then Y = {root} and the trapdoors of each keyword can be computed by using the information stored in node root. Otherwise, supposed keyword w 3 is revoked, then we have X = Path(w 3 ) = {root, 2, 5, 10}, and KUNode algorithm returns Y = {3, 4, 11}. So non-revoked keywords have one ancestor (or, themselves) which belongs to the set Y , and the ancestor node can be used to generate the trapdoor, for example, {3} for keywords {w 5 , w 6 , w 7 , w 8 }, {4} for {w 1 , w 2 } and {11} for keyword w 4 , while all of the nodes on the path about the revoked keywords have been excluded.
E. RECOCATION IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION
Here a general revocable identity-based encryption consists of 7 algorithms =(SetUp, PKG, KeyUp, DKG, Enc, Dec, Revoke) as follows [8] , [31] , which will be used at the security proof of our scheme:
• SetUp(λ, N )→ (pp, mk, UL, RL, st): takes security parameter λ and the number of users N as input, then outputs public parameters pp and master key mk, the initial user list UL = ∅, the initial revocation list RL = ∅, and a state st.
• PKG(pp, mk, id, st) → (SK id , st): inputs pp, mk, user id and st, then outputs a secret key SK id and the updated state st.
• KeyUp(pp, mk, T , RL, st) → KU T : inputs pp, mk, a time-period T , the current revocation list RL and state st, outputs key update information KU T .
• DKG(pp, SK id , KU T ) → DK id,T or ⊥: inputs pp, SK id , KU T , outputs ⊥ if id has been revoked at time T , otherwise outputs decryption key DK id,T .
• Enc(pp, id, T , M ) → CT id,T : inputs pp, id, T , and a message M , outputs ciphertext CT id,T .
• Dec(pp, DK id,T , CT id,T ) → M : inputs pp, DK id,T , CT id,T , then outputs M .
• Revoke(id, T , RL, UL, st) → RL: takes id, T , the current revocation list RL, user list UL and state st as input, outputs the updated RL.
III. KEYWORDS REVOCABLE-PEKS
In the section, we introduce the general construction of KR-PEKS scheme, which is the same as that of Emura, Phong and Watanabe [28] besides a new security model. Compared with their work, our model satisfies Bounded trapdoor exposure resistance (Bounded TER) and trapdoor re-generability. Here we give the flow diagram as Figure 2 and a specific explanation.
• There are public key and private key of receiver, keywords list KL and revocation list RL generated, and revocation list is managed by the receiver. For each keyword, the receiver generates a (long-term) initial trapdoor it w,t and sends it to the server, where w is a keyword and t is a state. Then the receiver generates a trapdoor update tu T at time-period T and sends it to the server by insecure channel. Based on the initial trapdoor it w,t and the trapdoor update tu T , the server generates a (short-term) trapdoor t w,T with time T , which will be used in test algorithm. Thus the trapdoor is only valid for ciphertext C w,T at the time period T . The impact of trapdoor exposure will be minimized.
• The scheme model can realize the re-generation of trapdoors for some keywords which have been revoked by using tag and keywords revocation list KL. When a keyword is revoked, a new tag t will be chosen and then store (w, t ) into KL. So combining initial trapdoor algorithm and trapdoor update algorithm, we can generate a new trapdoor to be used for secure search, while the old information cannot affect the new generation. 
A. SYNTAX OF KR-PEKS

. (The update information is sent to server through insecure channel).
•
TdG(pk, it w,t , tu T ) → t w,T or ⊥: The probabilistic trapdoor generation algorithm is run by server. It inputs pk, it w,t , tu T , outputs ⊥ if w has been revoked at time T . Otherwise outputs trapdoor t w,T .
PEKS(pk, w, T ) → C w,T :The probabilistic encryption algorithm is run by sender. It inputs pk, w, T , and outputs ciphertext C w,T . (The ciphertext will be sent to server.)
Test(pk, C w,T , t w,T ) → 0 or 1: The deterministic test algorithm is run by server. It inputs pk, C w,T , t w,T , outputs 1 if C w,T and t w,T have same keyword and timeperiod, otherwise outputs 0.
KRevoke(w, RL, KL, ST ) → (RL, KL): Keywords revocable algorithm is run by receiver. It takes w, the current revocable list RL, keywords list KL and state ST as input, updates KL and RL by adding (w, t) into RL and removing (w, t) from KL, outputs the updated RL, KL.
B. CONSISTENCY AND SECURITY
Based on the above model, there is a requirement for keywords consistency: given w ∈ W , T ∈ T , keywords list KL, revocation list RL, if the keyword w has not been revoked at time T , then for the generated trapdoor t w,T and ciphertext C w,T , Test algorithm outputs 1.
Consistency:
The definition is the same as [29] except adding the generation of initial trapdoor and trapdoor update information, which implies if w = w , where w is used in PEKS and w is used in TdG, Test outputs 1 with negligible probability. Revocation consistency: We give a modification on the oracle access for Emura et al.'s work [28] and introduce a definition of revocation consistency, which requires that any adversary cannot generate a trapdoor t w ,T * after keywords w was revoked at T * , to make the Test algorithm outputs 1 for a ciphertext of w and t w ,T * . We don't require w = w . 2 
Definition 3.2: For a PPT adversary A with security parameter λ, we define an experiment Exp consist
A (λ) as follows. ((pk, sk), RL, KL, st) ← KeyGen (λ, N w ) (w, w , T * ) ← A (pk) C w ← PEKS (pk,
Definition 3.3: For a PPT adversary A and security parameter λ, we define an experiment Exp
If (w , T ) was sent to KRevoke where T T * and Test(pk, C w * , t w ,T * ) = 1, returns 1. Otherwise returns 0 . Some oracles that A can access in the above experiment, denoted by O, which consists of a set of several oracles
One KR-PEKS scheme is said to satisfy revocation consistency, if the advantage Adv
• O Add : The oracle takes keyword w and time T as the input, invokes ITDG algorithm, stores the output it w,t , where t is the state, and then adds (w, t) into KL.
• O ITDG : The oracle takes keyword w and time T as the input, if (w, t) ∈ KL on the time T , returns the stored it w,t , otherwise outputs ⊥.
• O TdUP : The oracle takes time T as the input, runs TdUP algorithm to output tu T .
• O TdG : The oracle invokes TdG algorithm to output t w,T by using the stored it w,t if (w, t) ∈ KL on time T and tu T , otherwise output ⊥.
• O KRevoke : The oracle takes w and time T as the input, runs KRevoke to return revocation list RL T . Here we give some constraints about the query of oracles. Privacy: A PEKS scheme firstly needs to guarantee that no useful keywords information can be leaked from the ciphertext [29] . Here an adversary is allowed to obtain the initial trapdoors even the challenge keyword, while it has been revoked at time periods T * and tries to distinguish between the challenge ciphertext and a random element chosen uniformly from the ciphertext set, which means the initial trapdoor is meaningless for deducing the keyword from the ciphertext.
We also consider Q-Bounded trapdoor exposure resistance, the adversary is allowed to obtain at most Q short-term trapdoors for the challenge keywords w * . Thus a short-term trapdoor is useless for the other time periods even if the trapdoor is revealed. Obviously, it's weaker than (unbounded) trapdoor exposure resistance proposed on [28] . And we consider regeneration of trapdoor revoked, the following content defines the adversary is allowed to obtain trapdoor at time T 1 , revoke it at T 2 , and re-generate a new one at T 3 , where T 1 < T 2 < T 3 . 
Definition 3.4: For a PPT adversary A , security parameter λ, and any a priori fixed number Q = Ploy(λ), we define the following security experiment, denoted by Exp
privacy A (λ). (w * , T * , state) ← R A (λ) ((pk, sk), RL, KL, st) ← R KeyGen (λ, N w ) C 0 ← PEKS (pk, w * , T * ) C 1 ← R C λ , b ← R {0, 1}, b ← A O (guess, C b , state). Ifb = b,
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTION A. CONSTRUCTION
In the section, we give a lattice-based KR-PEKS scheme, which can achieve bounded trapdoor exposure resistance and have the potential for resisting quantum computing attack. Here we apply the classical transformation from a generic IBE scheme to PEKS which was proposed by Abdalla et al. [29] . Let a keyword as an identity, and trapdoor can be regarded as a decryption key. The keyword is used to encrypt R, a plaintext randomly chosen from a uniform distribution of plaintext space, to output a C w , and the trapdoor is used to decrypt the ciphertext, if the decryption succeeds, test algorithm outputs 1. Otherwise outputs 0.
W , T , Tag stand for the set of keywords, time periods and tag, respectively.
• KeyGen(λ, N w )→ (pk, sk, KL, RL, st): Given security parameter λ and the number of keywords N w as input, set some positive parameters q, n, m, σ, α, Q, where σ is the parameter used in sampling algorithm and α is the parameter of following noise distribution. 1) Run trapdoor algorithm TrapGen(q, n, m) to select uniformly a random matrix A 0 ∈ Z n×m q with a basis Here let a binary tree be the state, the tree is empty at first and will be changing with join and remove of keywords.
• ITDG(pk, sk, w, KL, ST )→ (it w,t , KL, st): Input public key pk and private key sk, a keyword w ∈ Z n q , a revocation list KL, and state ST , randomly choose an unassigned leaf η from BT and store w in the node. 1) For each node θ ∈ Path(η),
and an updated state ST and KL.
• TdUP(pk, sk, T , RL T , ST )→ tu T : Input public key pk and private key sk, a time period T ∈ T , an revocation list RL, and state ST . 1) For each node θ ∈ KUNode(BT , RL, T ), recall
2) Output trapdoor update information tu T = ({θ, e θ } θ ∈KUNode , F T ), where F T is a d-bit string such that l-th bit is one for l ∈ F T and other bits are zero. VOLUME 7, 2019 • TdG(pk, it w,t , tu T )→ t w,T : Input public key pk, initial trapdoor it w,t , and trapdoor update tu T . Output ⊥ if Θ TU ∩ Θ KW = ∅, which means the considering keyword (or the node η) has been revoked at this time, and there is not any ancestor for this keywords in the output set of KUNode algorithm. Otherwise, for θ ∈ Θ TU ∩ Θ KW , compute e θ = l∈F T e θ,l and a trapdoor t w,T = (e θ , e θ ). Here Θ KW and Θ TU are the sets Path(η) and the output set of KUNode algorithm, respectively.
• PEKS(pk, w, T )→ C w,T : Input public key pk, keyword w and time T . 1) Choose uniformly a random element R ∈ {0, 1}, 
2) Compare c and q
• KRevoke(w, T , RL, KL, st)→ (RL, KL ): 1) Add (w, t) into RL, and remove (w, t) from KL to get a update keyword list KL . 2) Return the KL and RL.
B. CONSISTENCY AND PARAMETERS
To guarantee the consistency of scheme, proper parameters should be selected to bind the noise in test algorithm, where w is the keyword in C w,T and w is the keyword in t w ,T . On the above construction, the test algorithm succeeds if and only if the decryption for element R succeeds. We have the following result.
is the error term.
Our scheme is constructed based on the previous RIBE [8] . Thus we set the related parameters as the same with the RIBE scheme of Takayasu and Watanabe [8] and let n be security parameter:
• Error term is less than q 5 with high probability, i.e.
• σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight,
• For Regev's reduction, q > 2 √ n/α. So we set these parameters as follows, and let q be larger prime. Assume δ satisfies
Here we give a proof for the revocation consistency as follows. Firstly, we recall a security result about Takayasu et al.'s RIBE scheme which is based on the hardness of LWE problem from lattice. Then we show a reduction between RIBE and revocation consistency of the corresponding KR-PEKS as Lemma 9. Then we can prove the revocation consistency of our scheme by combining these two lemmas.
Lemma 8: [8] If LWE assumption holds and the CFF is Q cover free and k-uniform, then RIBE is IND-sRID-Q-CPA secure.
Proof: This proof uses hybrid argument and constructs a series of security games, denote E i as the event that adversary wins the i-th game. Then let |Pr[E i ] − 1 2 | be the adversary's advantage in this game. The first game is the same as the model of IND-sRID-Q-CPA, while the last game means the challenge ciphertext is a random element chosen uniformly from the ciphertext set. Since the adversary's advantage for every game is negligible, the adversary cannot distinguish the first game and the last game. Hence the proof is completed. We can find the detail of proof in Takayasu et al.'s work [8] .
Lemma 9: If a underlying RIBE scheme is IND-sRID-Q-CPA secure, then the corresponding KR-PEKS satisfies revocation consistency defined in section III.
Proof: Let A be an adversary against revocation consistency, and C be the challenger for IND-sRID-Q-CPA security. Then we construct an algorithm B to break the INDsRID-Q-CPA security by invoking algorithm A . First, B chooses w * , T * as the challenge keywords and time period, then C runs SetUp(λ, N w ) → (pk, sk, RL, st) and sends pk to B. For oracle query, B employs O Add on (w, T ) as the Join query. C chooses t ∈ Tag to run PKG(pk, sk, w, st) → (SK w,t , st) and adds (w, t) into UL. B queries O ITDG for w ∈ W as a PKG query. And C sends sk w,t to B. Let the initial trapdoor it w,t := SK w,t , which will be sended to A . B runs trapdoor update query O TdUp for T ∈ T to C as a O KeyGen query. C runs KeyUp(pk, sk, T , RL T , st) and returns ku T to B. Let tu T := ku T and B sends it to A . B runs O KRevoke for (w, T ) to C as a Revoke query. Then C runs Revoke (w, T , RL T −1 , UL, st) and returns RL T to B who sends it to A . For O TdG query for (w, T ), B forwards it to C as a DKG query. C runs DKG (pk, it w,t , tu T ) and returns DK w,T to B. B sets t w,T := DK w,T and sends it to A . By the above queries, A outputs (w , t w ,T * ) where w has been revoked at T * . B chooses a message M ∈ M randomly, and sends it to C as a challenge. C runs Enc(pk, w * , T * , M ) → CT 0 , and randomly chooses a ciphertext CT 1 ∈ C λ . Then C chooses randomly CT b and sends it to B, where b ∈ {0, 1}. B decrypts CT b by using t w ,T * , and breaks the IND-sRID-Q-CPA security.
C. SECURITY
In the section, we consider the security of our scheme. Firstly, we show a discussion about known ciphertext attack on our construction. Assuming that sever is ''honest but curious'', where the sever can execute the system honestly but intend to derive extra useful information by analyzing curiously the receiving content. For our scheme, sever can obtain the ciphertext (from the sender) to achieve test algorithm and keyword search. Thus we consider a threat model, known ciphertext model [18] to protect the keywords against the server. The ciphertext can be regarded as an LWE instance for short noise, and it cannot be distinguished with a random element chosen from the ciphertext space. Moreover, the server cannot know the receiver's secret key. Based on the hardness of LWE problem, sever cannot deduce useful things about keywords from the ciphertext.
Then we consider the privacy defined in section III. Here we transform an RIBE scheme with bounded decryption key exposure resistance proposed by Takayasu and Watanabe [8] , which has been proved that it's IND-sRID-Q-CPA security based on LWE assumption from lattice, and the adversary cannot distinguish the challenge ciphertext and a random one chosen from the ciphertext space, so the scheme satisfies anonymity for identity, which is an important property for privacy of searchable encryption.
From the definition of cover free family, the #(T ) sets F i are the subsets of [d], and they satisfy that the union of any Q subsets cannot contain other subsets, so the scheme can realize Q-bounded trapdoor exposure resistance and then satisfy the requirement of privacy intuitively. We give the proof on security as Proof: The definition of IND-sRID-Q-CPA security model can be found in [8] . Let A be an adversary against privacy, C be the challenger for IND-sRID-Q-CPA security. Then we construct an algorithm B to break IND-sRID-Q-CPA. First, B chooses w * , T * as the challenge keywords and time period, then C runs algorithm SetUp(λ, N w ) → (pk, sk, RL, st) by invoking KeyGen algorithm, then sends pk to B.
For the oracle query, B invokes O Add query for (w, T ) as the Join query, then C chooses t ∈ Tag, and runs PKG(pk, sk, w, st) → (SK w,t , st), add (w, t) into UL. B executes O ITDG query for w ∈ W to C as a PKG query. And C sends the stored sk w,t to B. B sets the initial trapdoor it w,t := SK w,t and returns it to A . B runs trapdoor update query O TdUp for T ∈ T to C as a O KeyGen query. C runs KeyUp(pk, sk, T , RL T , st), returns ku T to B. B sets tu T := ku T and sends it to A . B runs O KRevoke query for (w, T ) to C as a Revoke query. Then C runs Revoke (w, T , RL T −1 , UL, st) and returns RL T to B. And B sends it to A . For a O TdG query for (w, T ), B forwards it to C as a DKG query. C runs DKG (pk, it w,t , tu T ) and returns DK w,T to B. And B sets t w,T := DK w,T and sends it to A . Based on the above queries, B randomly chooses a message M * ∈ M , and sends it to C . C runs Enc(pk, w * , T * , M * ) → CT 0 , and randomly chooses a ciphertext CT 1 ∈ C λ . Then C chooses randomly CT b and sends it to B, where b ∈ {0, 1}. B sets C b = CT b and sends it to A . And A excutes the above oracle queries and outputs b and sends it to B, then breaks the IND-sRID-Q-CPA security.
We complete the proof.
D. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the section, we give a comparison of performance with other searchable encryption schemes as Table 2 and Table 3 . These schemes are based on different hard assumption, such as General Approximate Common Divisor (GACD) problem on integer [18] , Bilinear Diffie Hellman (BDH) problem on bilinear maps [15] , and LWE problem on lattice [21] . Considering the computational cost of related algorithms as Table 2 , PEKS algorithm needs 4 matrix multiplications and 2 hash operation, and test algorithm needs 2 matrix multiplications in our scheme. Especially, our scheme owns initial trapdoor and trapdoor update algorithm to achieve keywords revocation, while the other three schemes in comparison don't have these two algorithms. So we add these two algorithms as parts of trapdoor generation to consider the cost of trapdoor generation algorithm as Table 2 , which needs 2 SampleLeft operations, 2 hash operations, and 2 multiplications. We can note that the initial trapdoor algorithm need not run repeatedly if keywords are not revoked. Reference [15] can realize the revocation function, and this scheme needs pairing operations which are believed inefficient. Reference [21] is under the assumption of LWE problem, however, the scheme needs Matrix inversion operation. The computational cost of [18] for each subalgorithm is linear on the number of keywords.
In terms of storage, [21] and our scheme need more storage than the pairing-based counterparts and GACD-based scheme. Referring to Table 3 , for 192-bits security, the sizes of ciphertext of our scheme is 12135 Kb and the size of the trapdoor is 16180 Kb. The size of trapdoor of our scheme is larger than [21] , which is resulted from the revocation function. For revocation function and post-quantum side, our scheme not only realizes revocation function and Bounded TER but also resists quantum computing attack.
Furthermore, we conduct some simulation experiments by Python 3.7 program. The environment is windows 10 ultimate (x64) with Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-8550U and Processor 2.00GHZ. Let the finite field be GF(32749) and m be 6000, 7000, 8000, 9000 and 10000 with 80-bits security, where n = 256, σ = 8, and get the corresponding running time of PEKS algorithm as Figure 3 and Test algorithm as Figure 4 . Here each experiment is repeated 30 times under the different parameters. Then we show the average time and minimum time in these figures.
V. CONCLUSION
In the work, we first study how to realize the searchable encryption scheme with supporting trapdoor exposure resistance under the context of quantum computing attack. For this subject, we introduce novel security on keywords revocable searchable encryption scheme, bounded trapdoor exposure resistance and trapdoor regeneration, which guarantees that the scheme is secure even if bounded number trapdoors for each keyword are exposed. Then we propose a lattice-based KR-PEKS scheme with the new security, which can resist quantum computing attack. We also conduct some simulation experiments on the computational cost of our scheme and a comparison with other searchable schemes. As a future work, we consider how to construct the searchable encryption scheme against (unbounded) trapdoor exposure on lattice.
